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Introduction
It would be an honor for me to speak to you at any time, but I’m
particularly honored to be doing so now, on the thirtieth anniversary
of the Sumner Canary Lecture delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, my
former boss and mentor. His lecture, titled Assorted Canards of
Contemporary Legal Analysis, described his “most hated legal
canards”—baseless but frequently repeated statements that lawyers are
“condemned to read, again and again, in the reported cases.”1 He took
aim, for example, at the hoary canon that “remedial statutes are to be
broadly construed.” He asked, “How are we to know what is a remedial
statute?” “Are not all statutes intended to remedy some social
problem?” “And why should we construe any statute broadly?”
Statutes should be construed neither broadly nor narrowly, but at the
level of generality at which they are written. And he bemoaned the
well-worn phrase, “A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little
minds.” Why is consistency in the law a bad thing?
Tonight, in the spirit of Justice Scalia’s Canary Lecture, I’m going
to share my own list of canards.

†

Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. This Essay
is adapted from the 2019 Sumner Canary Lecture delivered at Case
Western Reserve University School of Law on September 19, 2019.

1.

Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 581, 581 (1989).
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I. Textualism is Literalism
Here is my first: “textualism is literalism.” Before I explain why
this is false, I ought to begin with a very brief definition of textualism.
Textualism, a method of statutory interpretation closely associated
with Justice Scalia, insists that judges must construe statutory
language consistent with its “ordinary meaning.”2 The law is comprised
of words—and textualists emphasize that words mean what they say,
not what a judge thinks that they ought to say. For textualists,
statutory language is a hard constraint. Fidelity to the law means
fidelity to the text as it is written.
Textualism stands in contrast to purposivism, a method of
statutory interpretation that was dominant through much of the
twentieth century. For purposivists, statutory language isn’t necessarily
a hard constraint. As one famous Supreme Court case put it, “[A] thing
may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute,
because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.”3
Sometimes, statutory language appears to be in tension with a statute’s
overarching goal, and when that happens, purposivists argue that a
judge should go with the goal rather than the text.
Today, purposivism is largely out of fashion, at least in its more
extreme form. It was once unsurprising to see a judicial opinion stress
the importance of adhering to a statute’s purpose even at the expense
of clear text. Now, however, it’s rare to see a judicial opinion asserting
the authority to depart from the statutory text in service of the
statutory purpose. The shift away from purposivism is largely due to
the force of Justice Scalia’s arguments. As he put it, “It is the law that
governs, not the intent of the lawgiver. . . . Men may intend what they
will; but it is only the laws that they enact which bind us.”4 I won’t
rehearse all of his arguments against purposivism here, but suffice it to
say that they have had a significant effect on the way that lawyers and
judges think about the law.
The fact that textualism has become influential, however, does not
mean that everyone understands what it means to be a textualist. And
one misunderstanding—held by some of textualism’s sympathizers as
well as by some of its critics—is that textualism is literalism. Some who
have only passing familiarity with the theory assume that textualism
requires judges to construe language in a wooden, literalistic way. And
that, of course, would lead to absurd results.
If you want a vivid illustration of the dangers of literalism, consider
the pitfalls of translating from one language to another. When I was in
2.

Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Texts 69–77 (2012).

3.

Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).

4.

Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and
the Law 17 (Amy Guttmann ed., 1997).
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college, I spent a summer in France with the primary goal of becoming
fluent in French. One evening at dinner, my host asked if I wanted
more food, and I responded, translating literally, “Je suis pleine”—“I
am full.” I was proud of myself for responding in French. But my
sentence was greeted with uproarious laughter—and not, as I initially
assumed, because I spoke French with a distinctive southeastern
Louisiana accent. It was much worse than that. I learned that in
French, the phrase “je suis pleine” means “I am pregnant.” One could
make a similar gaffe by declining food with the phrase “je suis fini,”
which, literally translated, means “I am finished.” In French, though,
this phrase means “I am about to expire.” Perhaps such mistakes might
make one want to expire.
As a budding French speaker, I was unaware of the nuance.
Language is a social construct made possible by shared linguistic
conventions among those who speak the language. It cannot be
understood out of context, and literalism strips language of its context.
As my examples illustrate, fluent speakers of language are not
literalists. There is a lot more to understanding language than mechanistically consulting dictionary definitions.
Textualists understand this, and they have spent more than thirty
years driving home the point. Justice Scalia himself insisted that “the
good textualist is not a literalist.”5 Still, textualism and literalism are
often treated as synonyms. The distinction between them, though, is
fundamental to the validity of the textualist enterprise. Here is how one
scholar distinguishes the two:
Literalism should be distinguished from the genuine search for
textual meaning based on the way people commonly understand
language. Literalism is a kind of “spurious” textualism,
unconcerned with how people actually communicate—with how
the author wanted to use language or the audience might
understand it. It holds up the text in isolation from actual usage.6

Collapsing the distinction is a strawman when presented by critics of
textualism and a dangerous distortion when floated by textualists
themselves. It bears emphasis, though, that this might be the most
common misperception of textualism. I teach a seminar on statutory
interpretation, and after our class on textualism, students routinely say
that they were surprised to learn that textualism isn’t the same thing
as either “literalism” or “strict construction.” Despite the best efforts
of textualists, the caricature is still around.

5.

Id. at 24.

6.

William D. Popkin, Material on Legislation: Political Language
and the Political Process 224 (3d ed. 2001).
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II. A Dictionary is the Textualist’s Most Important
Tool
This rejection of literalism bleeds right into the next proposition
that I would like to shoot down: “A dictionary is a textualist’s most
important tool.” Don’t get me wrong—a dictionary is a tool, and it is
one used by interpreters of all stripes. But because textualism isn’t
literalism, textualists do not come to the enterprise of statutory
interpretation armed only with a dictionary. As John Manning—a
prominent textualist scholar (and now dean of Harvard Law School)—
explains, “[D]ictionary definitions of words will often fail to account for
settled nuances or background conventions that qualify the literal
meaning of language and, in particular, of legal language.”7 A dictionary
can help, but it can’t get you all the way there.
Justice Scalia frequently invoked the case Smith v. United States to
make this point.8 In that case, the Supreme Court was faced with the
task of deciding what it means to “use a firearm” for purposes of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), a statute that prohibits a felon from using a gun.9
The majority (of which Justice Scalia was not a member) cited multiple
dictionary definitions of the verb “to use” and concluded that “[a]s the
dictionary definitions and experience make clear, one can use a firearm
in a number of ways.”10 So it held that a person who trades his firearm
for drugs “uses” the firearm during a drug-trafficking crime within the
meaning of § 924(c)(1).11
In dissent, Justice Scalia explained that the fact that a word can
be used a certain way does not mean that it is ordinarily used that way
or that it was used that way in a particular context.12 In his view, the
majority’s reliance on multiple, broad dictionary definitions of what the
term “use” could mean violated the “fundamental principle of statutory
construction (and, indeed, of language itself) that the meaning of a
word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the
context in which it is used.”13 In typical fashion, he offered a memorable
illustration to bring his point home:
When someone asks, “Do you use a cane?,” he is not inquiring
whether you have your grandfather’s silver-handled walking stick
on display in the hall; he wants to know whether you walk with
7.

John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2387, 2393
(2003).

8.

508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993).

9.

Id.

10.

Id. at 228–30.

11.

Id. at 225.

12.

Id. at 241–42 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

13.

Id. at 241 (quoting Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993)).
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a cane. Similarly, to speak of “using a firearm” is to speak of using
it for its distinctive purpose, i.e., as a weapon.14

This isn’t to say that dictionaries are useless; it’s simply a warning
against overstating their usefulness. They should be used as evidence
that terms can in fact bear a certain meaning, not as conclusive
evidence of what a term means in context.
The upshot here is that textualism isn’t about holding language “in
isolation from actual usage.” It isn’t about taking things out of context
or strictly construing language that isn’t strict. It is about identifying
the plain communicative content of the words. “A text should not be
construed strictly, and it should not be construed leniently; it should
be construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means.”15

III. Textualists and Originalists Always Agree
I hope I’ve made it clear by now that textualism isn’t a mechanical
exercise, but rather one involving a sophisticated understanding of
language as it’s actually used in context. That principle brings me to
my third canard: “Textualists always agree.” Those who take an
oversimplified view of textualism imagine that it works like Google
Translate: a judge punches in words, and—voila!—out pops the result.
If that were how interpretation worked, one could expect every
textualist judge to interpret text in exactly the same way. Popping
words into a mental machine, after all, does not require judgment.
Construing language in context, however, does require judgment.
Skilled users of language won’t always agree on what language means
in context. Textualist judges agree that the words of a statute
constrain—but they may not always agree on what the words mean.
Thus, in a case that preceded my time on the Seventh Circuit, two of
my colleagues on the court—both textualists—disagreed about whether
Title VII, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.16 Judge Frank
Easterbrook joined the majority, which held that it does;17 Judge Diane
Sykes wrote a dissent arguing that it does not.18 Neither disavowed the
text; they simply disagreed about what the text meant.
The same holds true for originalists, who insist that judges must
adhere to the original public meaning of the Constitution’s text.
Justices Scalia and Thomas are both known as originalists, yet they
14.

Id. at 242.

15.

Scalia, supra note 4, at 23.

16.

Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en
banc).

17.

Id. at 340–41.

18.

Id. at 359 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
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didn’t agree in every case. The differences between them enable my
friend Judge Amul Thapar of the Sixth Circuit to teach a class at the
University of Virginia that he colloquially describes as “Scalia versus
Thomas.” Here is an example of a case in which those two Justices
diverged: in Davis v. Washington,19 the Court had to decide whether
the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause prohibits the admission
of statements made during a 911 call.20 Justice Scalia wrote the majority
opinion, grounding the Court’s decision in an analogy to statements
that would have been considered “testimonial” at common law.21 The
relevant portion of the 911 call qualified as “nontestimonial hearsay,”
the majority held, because its “primary purpose” was not “to establish
or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution”
but rather “to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.”22
Justice Thomas, by contrast, rejected the majority’s “primary purpose”
test.23 He chided the majority for selecting a standard “disconnected
from history” and observed that “the Court all but concedes that no
case can be cited for its conclusion.”24 Justice Thomas read the
historical record to support a much narrower Confrontation Clause test:
only those statements that “include ‘extrajudicial statements . . .
contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits,
depositions, prior testimony, or confessions’” are prohibited from
admission.25
On the current Court, Justices Thomas and Gorsuch have been the
most vocal about their commitment to originalism. But they don’t
always agree either. Just last Term, they split in Gamble v. United
States, a case that validated the so-called “dual sovereignty doctrine”
of the Double Jeopardy Clause.26 That doctrine means that two offenses
are not “the same offense” for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause
if they are prosecuted by separate sovereigns.27 Thus, the federal
government can’t prosecute someone twice for the same murder, but
the Double Jeopardy Clause doesn’t bar the state and federal
governments from each prosecuting someone for the same murder.

19.

547 U.S. 813 (2006).

20.

Id. at 817.

21.

Id.

22.

Id. at 822.

23.

Id. at 834 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).

24.

Id. at 838.

25.

Id. at 836 (alteration in original) (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346,
365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring)).

26.

139 S. Ct. 1960, 1964 (2019).

27.

Id. at 1977.
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Where there are two sovereigns, there are two laws and therefore two
different offenses.
Justice Gorsuch dissented from that holding on the ground that the
dual-sovereignty doctrine is inconsistent with the original meaning of
the Fifth Amendment.28 Justice Thomas, however, agreed with the
majority. In his concurring opinion, he had this to say:
The historical record presents knotty issues about the original
meaning of the Fifth Amendment, and Justice Gorsuch does an
admirable job arguing against our longstanding interpretation of
the Double Jeopardy Clause. Although Justice Gorsuch identifies
support for his view in several postratification treatises, I do not
find these treatises conclusive without a stronger showing that
they reflected the understanding of the Fifth Amendment at the
time of ratification. . . . Ultimately, I am not persuaded that our
precedent is incorrect as an original matter, much less
demonstrably erroneous.29

In short, even card-carrying originalists don’t always wind up at
the same spot, and it oversimplifies originalism to expect that they
always will.

IV. “[W]e must never forget, it is a constitution we
are expounding.”
In his Canary Lecture thirty years ago, Justice Scalia identified and
attempted to correct the common misuse of one of Chief Justice
Marshall’s most famous quotes from McCulloch v. Maryland: “[W]e
must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding.”30 Justice
Scalia explained that this quote “is often trotted out, nowadays, to
make the point that the Constitution does not have a fixed meaning—
that it must be given different content, from generation to generation,
retaining the ‘flexibility’ needed to keep up with the times.”31 In his
view, this reading of Chief Justice Marshall’s language is exactly
backwards. Rather than sanctioning judicially guided constitutional
evolution, the McCulloch quote is simply an acknowledgment that “it
is the nature of a constitution not to set forth everything in express and

28.

Id. at 1996 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“[T]his ‘separate sovereigns
exception’ to the bar against double jeopardy finds no meaningful support
in the text of the Constitution, its original public meaning, structure, or
history.”).

29.

Id. at 1987 (citation omitted).

30.

Scalia, supra note 1, at 594 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819)).

31.

Id.
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minute detail” precisely because it is a fixed document “intended to
endure for ages to come” as is.32
So Justice Scalia made the point that the McCulloch quote offers
no support for a theory of an evolving constitution. Today, I want to
make a different but related point: the McCulloch quote offers no
support for the idea that the Constitution should be interpreted
differently from other legal texts. After all, the Constitution is, at its
base, democratically enacted written law. Our approach to interpreting
it should be the same as it is with all written law.
I willingly concede that no matter how one reads “[W]e must never
forget, it is a constitution we are expounding,” Chief Justice Marshall
surely meant to communicate that the Constitution is unique.33 And he
was indisputably right. None of our other written laws purport to lay
out an entire system of government meant to endure through the ages.
That singularity often manifests itself in expansive phrasing and broad
delegations of congressional and executive authority to address
unforeseen circumstances.34 But as Justice Scalia explained elsewhere,
“The problem [of interpreting the Constitution] is distinctive, not
because special principles of interpretation apply, but because the usual
principles are being applied to an unusual text.”35 The text itself
remains a legal document, subject to the ordinary tools of
interpretation.
Due in large part, I’m sure, to Justice Scalia’s contributions, the
idea of approaching the Constitution like any other legal text has gained
not only traction but force in judicial opinions, and it has inspired a
rich proliferation of scholarship in the area.36 For example, Vasan
32.

Id. at 595–96 (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 415).

33.

Id. at 594.

34.

See Scalia, supra note 4, at 37 (“In textual interpretation, context is
everything, and the context of the Constitution tells us not to expect nitpicking detail, and to give words and phrases an expansive rather than
narrow interpretation—though not an interpretation that the language
will not bear.”); see also John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and
the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 Yale L.J. 1663, 1699–
700 (2004) (“Marshall’s statement merely addressed the virtue of recognizing
adequate congressional authority to address unforeseen circumstances under
the Necessary and Proper Clause.”); Keith E. Whittington, Originalism:
A Critical Introduction, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 375, 387 (2013) (“As
originalists have long recognized (and sometimes even emphasized), the
power-granting provisions of the Constitution are designed to give the
legislative and executive branches discretionary authority to make policy
and the necessary tools to implement those policies.”).

35.

Scalia, supra note 4, at 37; see also id. at 38 (“What I look for in the
Constitution is precisely what I look for in a statute: the original meaning
of the text . . . .”).

36.

See, e.g., Manning, supra note 34, at 1670 (“Whereas the Rehnquist Court
has tended toward textualism in statutory cases, few would contend that
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Kesavan and Michael Stokes Paulsen have emphasized that “any
project of constitutional interpretation that seeks to apply the
Constitution as law must reckon with the fact that it is a written text
that the Constitution purports to make authoritative.”37 They also
point out that judges take an oath to be bound by that written text.38
So what does it mean to be bound by written law? Well, at the
very least it means that the meaning of the law is fixed when it is
written. This is a largely, though not entirely, uncontroversial propo–
sition when it comes to statutory interpretation. Textualists and
purposivists are both inclined to ground their approaches to statutory
interpretation in the concept of faithful agency, giving voice and
authority to what the enacting Congress did in a particular statute.39
Textualists, though, place more significance on the very existence
of a written, enacted law. As I said before, textualists limit the meaning
of text to the semantic communicative content (in context) of the words
themselves—not some underlying purpose behind the words—because
it is the words themselves that are written down and enacted. Indeed,
those words “reflect (unknowable) legislative compromise,” and “the
carefully drawn lawmaking process prescribed by the Constitution
makes it imperative for judges to respect such compromise.”40 That
means reading the text of the statute at the level of specificity and
generality at which it was written, even if the result is awkward or the
interpretation “does not appear to make perfect sense of the statute’s

constitutional interpretation warrants the same strictness as statutory
interpretation. Instead, the conventional wisdom, often traced (mistakenly)
to McCulloch v. Maryland, presupposes that judges have greater freedom
to interpret the Constitution atextually to effectuate its broader purposes.
. . . I argue here that the conventional wisdom is backwards . . . .”).
37.

Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the
Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 Geo. L.J. 1113, 1128 (2003).

38.

Id. at 1127–28 (“But if one does decide to be bound by [the Constitution]
(and takes an oath to support it, as the very next clause of the
Constitution requires for all legislative, executive, and judicial officers
holding positions under the regime created by the Constitution), one
necessarily has decided to be bound by the text as law, because that is
what the document itself appears to specify.” (footnote omitted)); see also
Amy Coney Barrett & John Copeland Nagle, Congressional Originalism,
19 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1, 8–9 (2016) (describing originalism’s claim that
the original public meaning of the Constitution’s text is enforceable law).

39.

See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101
Colum. L. Rev. 1, 9 (2001) (“[I]t is important to realize that strong
purposivism and textualism differ markedly in technique, but they do so
in the name of an ostensibly shared constitutional premise. In particular,
strong purposivism and textualism both seek to provide a superior way
for federal judges to fulfill their presumed duty as Congress’s faithful
agents.”).

40.

Manning, supra note 34, at 1713.
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overall policy.”41 That awkward compromise made it through the
process of becoming law.
When we look at the Constitution for what it is—a popularly
enacted legal text subject to the same kind of “bargaining and
compromise over the reach and structure of the policy under
consideration”42—it makes sense that statutory textualists are usually
constitutional originalists.43 These approaches are premised on the same
fundamental orientation toward legal text that finds legitimacy in
popular sovereignty. Kesavan and Paulsen summarize the import of
written law this way:
We therefore think that to avoid creeping or lurching
anachronism infecting the interpretation of an authoritative legal
text, the proper approach must be one of “originalist”
textualism—faithful application of the words and phrases of the
text in accordance with the meaning they would have had at the
time they were adopted as law, within the political and linguistic
community that adopted the text as law.44

Originalists, like textualists, care about what people understood words
to mean at the time that the law was enacted because those people had
the authority to make law. They did so through legitimate processes,
which included writing down and fixing the law. So “[e]ach textual
provision must necessarily bear the meaning attributed to it at the time
of its own adoption.”45 And, as with statutes, the law can mean no more
or less than that communicated by the language in which it is written.
Just as “when a precise statute seems over- or underinclusive in relation
to its ultimate aims[,] . . . [a textualist] hews closely to the rules
embedded in the enacted text, rather than adjusting that text to make
it more consistent with its apparent purposes,” so too an originalist
submits to the precise compromise reflected in the text of the

41.

Manning, supra note 39, at 3–4; see also Manning, supra note 34, at 1665,
1735.

42.

Manning, supra note 34, at 1715.

43.

See Manning, supra note 39, at 26.

44.

Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 37, at 1131.

45.

Whittington, supra note 34, at 377–78; see also Jeffrey A. Pojanowski &
Kevin C. Walsh, Enduring Originalism, 105 Geo. L.J. 97, 129 (“Putting
the Constitution in writing was one of the ways in which the law of the
Constitution was to be fixed.”); Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia
v. Heller and Originalism, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 923, 944–46 (2009)
(explaining the originalist premise that the meaning of the Constitution’s
text is fixed at the time of its formal legal approval).
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Constitution.46 That is how judges approach legal text, and the
Constitution is no exception.
I will end this section where I started, leaving you with a simple
but astute observation from Justice Scalia himself. The judiciary is
charged with authoritatively interpreting the Constitution because it is
a legal text—and interpreting it requires the same tools and skills that
one would bring to bear on any other legal text. Were it otherwise—
that is, “if the people come to believe that the Constitution is not a
text like other texts; that it means, not what it says or what it was
understood to mean, but what it should mean”—"well, then, they will
look for qualifications other than impartiality, judgment, and lawyerly
acumen in those whom they select to interpret it.”47 This is a
Constitution that we are expounding, unique in many ways. But it is
also, at its core, a legal text, and we should not misconstrue a quote
from the great Chief Justice Marshall as license to treat it as anything
else.

V. Judicial Activism is a Meaningful Term
As for the next canard, I will be brief—but I think my point will
be clear. The term “judicial activist” is thrown around a lot today, both
inside and outside the legal world. People use it all the time with great
authority, confident that they know exactly who the judicial activists
are. But there is no agreed-upon definition of what it means to be an
activist. The only thing that is clear is that it is never a compliment.
Sometimes, people use the term “judicial activism” to describe a
judge who is willing to hold a statute or executive action unconsti–
tutional. Judicial restraint, the argument goes, means deference to the
popular will; it is activism, therefore, to say that the popular will has
run afoul of constitutional limits. The problem, however, is that it has
been settled since Marbury v. Madison that judicial review is part of
the judicial function.48 Everyone agrees that judges—within the limits
of their authority, of course—must hold political actors accountable to
46.

Manning, supra note 34, at 1665; see id. at 1702 (“Precisely because
political minorities do have an extraordinary right to insist upon
compromise in the framing of constitutional texts, it is especially
important to pay attention to the level of generality of the relevant text—
that is, the type of compromise reached.”); Whittington, supra note 34,
at 386 (“Originalism has instead recently emphasized the value of fidelity
to the constitutional text as its driving principle. The goal of
constitutional interpretation is not to restrict the text to the most
manageable, easily applied, or majority-favoring rules. The goal is to
faithfully reproduce what the constitutional text requires. Textual rules
need not be narrow. The breadth of the rule is determined by the
embodied principle, not an a priori commitment to narrowness.”).

47.

Scalia, supra note 4, at 46–47.

48.

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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the Constitution. If a statute or executive action is unconstitutional, a
judge discharges her judicial duty by calling a spade a spade. So if
judicial activism merely means exercising judicial review, then it simply
describes a well-settled and uncontroversial part of what judges do.
When people use the term “judicial activism,” I think they are
really referring to a misuse of judicial authority. Criticizing misuses of
judicial authority is fair game, but we ought to do it with an
explanation of why a particular decision was misguided. As David
Kaplan wrote in his recent book about the Supreme Court, judicial
activism today means nothing more than “what the other guy does.”49
It goes without saying that finger-pointing isn’t an argument.

VI. Congressional Silence is Acquiescence
My next canard returns to statutory interpretation. It is the notion
that congressional inaction can tell us something about what Congress
thinks—what is known as “congressional acquiescence.” One noted
scholar and judge has explained the logic of the acquiescence rationale
this way: “When a court says to a legislature, ‘You (or your
predecessor) meant X,’ it almost invites the legislature to answer: ‘We
did not.’”50 So, the theory goes, if the legislature does not respond, then
the court, as Congress’s faithful agent, should treat its silence as
acquiescence or approval and stay the course even if the original
interpretation was wrong.
But there are several reasons why such an approach makes little
sense. For starters, why should we care what the current Congress
thinks about a previously enacted statute? Whether you think that
what matters is “the language of the statute enacted by Congress,”51
the intent or purpose behind the enacted statute,52 or something else,
49.

David A. Kaplan, The Most Dangerous Branch 12 (2018).

50.

Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 31–32
(1982); see also Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts
of Appeals, 73 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 317, 322 (2005); William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 67, 71–78 (1988);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 Geo. L.J.
1361, 1402–08 (1988).

51.

Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 461 (2002); see also Johnson
v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 671 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It
is . . . [a] patently false premise that the correctness of statutory
construction is to be measured by what the current Congress desires,
rather than by what the law as enacted meant.”).

52.

Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118
(1980); United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960); European Cmty.
v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 355 F.3d 123, 136 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that
“expressions of legislative intent made years after the statute’s initial
enactment are entitled to limited weight under any circumstances, even
when the post-enactment views of Congress as a whole are evident”),
vacated by 544 U.S. 1012 (2005).
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most theories of statutory interpretation seek to give a statute the
meaning it had at the time that it was enacted.53 So what a later
Congress thinks is irrelevant.54
And even if we did care, there is no way to reliably count on
congressional silence as a source of information. There are many reasons
other than approval for why Congress might not pass a bill to override
a court’s interpretation of a statute.55 For one, Congress must first know
about the judicial decision before the body can make a collective,
conscious decision to act (or not act) in response—and that is not a
given.56 Then, even assuming that Congress knows about a given
judicial interpretation and disagrees with the decision, it may be
deterred from acting out of concern for political expedience: Who takes
the credit? Who bears the responsibility? Is this the best time to act to
achieve the best result? How much capital—both political and
monetary—will this legislation cost? And on and on.57 But let us assume
that Congress knows about the decision, disagrees with it, and would
like to respond. Political realities might still prevent it from doing so.
This won’t come as news to anyone, but passing legislation is hard and
resources are limited. As I’ve said elsewhere, “Numerous obstacles, both
53.

See Lawrence C. Marshall, “Let Congress Do It”: The Case for an
Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 177, 193
(1989).

54.

See id. at 193 (“No one has ever explained how a court attempting to
understand the intent of a Congress that passed a statute in 1866 or 1870
can find any guidance in the views of a Congress sitting in the 1970s.”);
Price, 361 U.S. at 313 (“[T]he views of a subsequent Congress form a
hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.”).

55.

See United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 287 (2002) (“Congressional
inaction lacks persuasive significance because several equally tenable
inferences may be drawn from such inaction.”) (alteration in original)
(quoting Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511
U.S. 164, 187 (1994)); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164,
175 n.1 (1989) (“It does not follow . . . that Congress’ failure to overturn
a statutory precedent is reason for this Court to adhere to it. It is
‘impossible to assert with any degree of assurance that congressional
failure to act represents’ affirmative congressional approval of the Court’s
statutory interpretation.”) (quoting Johnson, 480 U.S. at 672 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).

56.

See Marshall, supra note 53, at 187 (“[I]t seems quite unrealistic to assume
that a substantial number of congressional actors are routinely made
aware of most court decisions on statutory matters. This being the case,
how can a court possibly find acquiescence in Congress’ silence?”). And if
members of Congress are unaware of Supreme Court decisions on matters
of statutory interpretation, it would seem even less likely that Congress
is aware of decisions at the court of appeals level. See Stefanie A.
Lindquist & David A. Yalof, Congressional Responses to Federal Circuit
Court Decisions, 85 Judicature 61, 61 (2001).

57.

See Barrett, supra note 50, at 335–36; Marshall, supra note 53, at 190–
91.
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procedural and practical, hinder the passage of legislation, and, as a
result, even a legislature with a majority that vehemently disagrees with
a judicial decision may fail to act on its disagreement.”58 Thus,
mistaking inaction for agreement “reflects a simple and complete
misunderstanding of the legislative process.”59
Equating abstract agreement with any kind of legal salience also
reflects a misunderstanding of the separation of powers prescribed by
the Constitution. This is the most fundamental flaw in the
approval-by-silence approach. Even if we could know that Congress’s
current silence on a particular statutory question meant that it whole–
heartedly endorsed a court’s interpretation of that statute, that
approval is not the standard by which the Constitution confers legal
effect. To have the force of law, a bill must be passed by both Houses
of Congress and presented to the President for possible veto.60 Congress
can’t shirk the responsibility of acting, sidestep procedural obstacles, or
skirt the President’s veto power in the name of efficiency. And courts
can’t usurp any of those same powers by assuming away the
bicameralism and presentment requirements. The Supreme Court has
been clear on this point: those requirements serve “essential constitu–
tional functions . . . [and] represent[] the Framers’ decision that the
legislative power of the Federal Government be exercised in accord with
a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure.”61
Relying on congressional silence for legal meaning thwarts that finely
wrought and exhaustively considered procedure.
I will conclude this section with a warning from Justice Frankfurter,
who was one of the first to recognize this canard and call out its folly:
To explain the cause of non-action by Congress when Congress
itself sheds no light is to venture into speculative unrealities. . . .
Various considerations of parliamentary tactics and strategy
might be suggested as reasons for the inaction of the Treasury
and of Congress, but they would only be sufficient to indicate
that we walk on quicksand when we try to find in the absence of
corrective legislation a controlling legal principle.62

It is, of course, a good thing that we have a process by which
Congress can override a court’s interpretation of a statute if the
58.

Barrett, supra note 50, at 336.

59.

Id.

60.

See U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (bicameralism and presentment).

61.

Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983);
see also Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175 n.1 (1989)
(“Congress may legislate, moreover, only through the passage of a bill
which is approved by both Houses and signed by the President. Congressional
inaction cannot amend a duly enacted statute.”) (citation omitted).

62.

Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119–21 (1940).
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interpretation does not reflect what Congress meant. But congressional
silence in the face of a judicial decision—constitutionally and prac–
tically—has no legitimate role in that process.

Conclusion
Justice Scalia ended his Canary Lecture not because he was out of
canards, but because he was out of time.63 Likewise, I could list canards
until the cows come home, but I will follow my boss’s lead and conclude
my remarks here. I hope that my contribution to Justice Scalia’s list
has shown that the last three decades have not done much to eradicate
our canard problem. We lawyers love to repeat what has already been
written—it’s our stock-in-trade. In its best form, our invocation of
vintage verbiage serves the purpose of tying us to precedent and
creating continuity in the law. But in its worst form we reflexively
repeat these “certain ritual errors” without scrutiny.64 We should not
mistake ubiquity for accuracy.

63.

Scalia, supra note 1, at 596.

64.

Id. at 581.
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